The United States federal government should substantially increase its student exchange programs with Mexico.

#### The affirmative reads one advantage premised off of the plan increasing the amount of STEM (science-technology-engineering-mathematics) workers. That’s good for two reasons:

#### 1) It improves American economic and military competitiveness which upholds hegemony – that’s good.

#### 2) It brings in new IT workers which improve US cyberdefenses and thwart a Chinese cyberattacks – those escalate because hackers can get control of US nuclear launch codes.

# Case

## STEM

### 1NC – STEM

#### STEM high now – empirics

Bruner 11 (Jon, Forbes, October 5, 2011, “American Leadership in Science, Measured in Nobel Prizes [Infographic],” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonbruner/2011/10/05/nobel-prizes-and-american-leadership-in-science-infographic/>, alp)

The graphic below demonstrates one of America’s most important strengths: its complete dominance of basic scientific research. Each day this week, phone calls will go out from Stockholm or Oslo to tell distinguished academics, writers and peacemakers that they’ve won a Nobel Prize. And, as they have for several decades, a majority of those calls will most likely go to American academics. That says a great deal about America’s place in the academy. The United States has won more Nobel prizes for physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine, and economics since World War II than any other country, by a wide margin (it has been less dominant in literature and peace, two awards that are much more broadly distributed among nations). At least one American has won a prize each year since 1935 (excluding the years 1940 through 1942, when no prizes were given out). And the United States became dominant after a very slow start: no American won a science prize in the first six years of the prize’s existence.

#### Cyberattacks won’t escalate – empirics

Libicki 8/16

(Martin C. Libicki, Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation and a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, Foreign Affairs, 8/16/2013, “Don't Buy the Cyberhype,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139819/martin-c-libicki/dont-buy-the-cyberhype, HSA)

Although the risk of a debilitating cyberattack is real, the perception of that risk is far greater than it actually is. No person has ever died from a cyberattack, and only one alleged cyberattack has ever crippled a piece of critical infrastructure, causing a series of local power outages in Brazil. In fact, a major cyberattack of the kind intelligence officials fear has not taken place in the 21 years since the Internet became accessible to the public.¶ Thus, while a cyberattack could theoretically disable infrastructure or endanger civilian lives, its effects would unlikely reach the scale U.S. officials have warned of. The immediate and direct damage from a major cyberattack on the United States could range anywhere from zero to tens of billions of dollars, but the latter would require a broad outage of electric power or something of comparable damage. Direct casualties would most likely be limited, and indirect causalities would depend on a variety of factors such as whether the attack disabled emergency 911 dispatch services. Even in that case, there would have to be no alternative means of reaching first responders for such an attack to cause casualties. The indirect effects might be greater if a cyberattack caused a large loss of confidence, particularly in the banking system. Yet scrambled records would probably prove insufficient to incite a run on the banks.

#### No impact to hegemony:

#### 1) Overstretch

Maher 11**—**PhD candidate in Political Science @ Brown

Richard, Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States Will Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, 11/12/2011 Orbis, ScienceDirect

To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States—in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating—one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law—has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe—such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008— the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good—a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries—in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia—continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States—maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest.

#### 2) Anti-Americanism

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As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the w+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++orld) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen—and under what conditions—military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen—let alone barely contemplated—such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy.

#### 3) Empirics prove

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs at U.S. Naval War College (Christopher J., “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Informaworld, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilizing power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

#### 4) High, resilient, and inevitable

Drezner 7/29 (Daniel, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution, contributing editor to Foreign Policy/Foreign Affairs, former professor at the University of Chicago and the University of Colorado, Boulder, Drezner has received fellowships from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Harvard University. BA from Williams College, MA and PhD in international relations from Stanford University, The Spectator, June 29, 2013, “While Britain stagnates, America is roaring back,” <http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8946671/while-britain-stagnates-america-is-roaring-back/>, alp)

Predicting the decline of the United States has been in vogue since the birth of American hegemony. Sputnik, Vietnam, stagflation, budget deficits, trade deficits and even the end of the Cold War all triggered predictions of the end of America. With the 2008 financial crisis, however, there seemed to be a sense that this time was different. Tomes with titles like The Post-American World and The End of Influence began to appear on bookshelves. Germany’s finance minister confidently predicted that the United States was entering its last days as a financial superpower. Serious commentators spoke about how a ‘Beijing consensus’ would supplant the ‘Washington consensus’. America looked as if it would disappear in a vortex of debt. Fast forward to this year, and a funny thing has happened to American influence — it’s unbowed. The very suggestion that America may be strong enough not to need quantitative easing sent global financial markets into spasm last week. If America was coming off life support, then the subsidies for all kinds of financial packages would end. As one financial strategist told the New York Times, ‘The Fed isn’t just the US’s central bank. It’s the world’s central bank.’ This point was not lost in Britain, where government borrowing costs surged. It’s said that when America sneezes, Britain catches a cold. But even as America gets better, Britain can remain ill. For those in Britain who are constantly told that the crisis ‘started in America’, this must all look rather strange. If the crash was an American disease, then shouldn’t Uncle Sam be worst affected? How come the US is now free of bailed-out banks, having sold them at a tidy $25 billion profit, when Britain looks like it will be saddled with zombie banks for another decade? And given that the Obama administration has spent the last few years deadlocked with a bickering Congress, how have the obstacles to growth been removed so quickly? Well, for one thing, there are some constants to American power. Its healthy demographics fuelled by immigration, geographic security, a syncretic, dynamic popular culture, and excellence in higher education and innovation are unchanged. As in previous slumps, private sector and public sector adjustments have triggered a revival in American capabilities. And this can be traced to the fact that it responded to the shock of the 2008 financial crisis more adroitly than its rivals. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the United States has actually been deleveraging from the bubble years of the past decade. Yes, millions of households were in foreclosure in America three years ago — but taking the pain then has allowed recovery now. While commentators have focused on rising government debt, US households and companies have been tackling their own. According to the OECD, the debt-to-income ratio for American households has fallen from a pre-crisis 137 per cent to 116 per cent by the end of last year. That figure is now lower than European household indebtedness. Britain is at 160 per cent. It is true that government debt has soared under Barack Obama — but that is consistent with the successful path that Scandinavian countries pursued in the early 1990s in response to their own credit bubbles. State spending propped up these economies while voters paid off their debt, and then the resurgence in private-sector demand allowed governments to balance the books. This appears to be happening now in the United States. The US federal budget deficit has declined more dramatically in the past three years than at any time in postwar history. The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal budget deficit to fall to 2.1 per cent of economic output by 2015 — an astonishing turnaround from the 10.1 per cent figure four years ago. By the same year, Britain’s deficit will still be at 6 per cent of GDP — the highest in the western world. American manufacturing is also on a roll. Contrary to perceptions, US factory output has been robust and productive — the problem was that it had been haemorrhaging jobs over the past few decades. No longer. Manufacturing might never be the jobs engine that it was a century ago — but it will not be a drag on job creation either. Durable goods manufacturing has added more than half a million jobs over the past three years. The intriguing question is whether this trend can continue. A 2011 Boston Consulting Group study argues it can, given that China is not quite the cheap workshop it once was (with rising wages and an appreciating yuan). The ‘rebalancing’ that Brits hear about is happening in the US, with up to three million jobs expected to be created in the next few years. The optimism felt by American factories is easy to explain. Energy costs have plunged. The development of hydraulic fracturing, or ‘hydro-fracking’, has sent gas prices to less than a third the level charged in Europe — quite some factor if you’re an energy-hungry manufacturer wondering where in the world to locate. Time after time, the answer to this question is: America. There has long been talk in the US about ‘reshoring’, where US companies decide to create jobs in the rustbelt states that need them most. But all sorts of companies are coming to America. Voestalpine, an Austrian steel company, declared in March that it would build a €550 million plant in Texas, having rejected 16 other sites in seven other countries. With an economic recovery comes geopolitical clout. Late last year the International Energy Agency projected that by 2020 the United States would supplant Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer. By 2030, the United States would realise its longstanding dream of energy self-sufficiency. And while the US government can hardly be credited with the fracking revolution, the Obama administration did not bar its progress — more than can be said for many European governments, some of which are so wedded to the renewables agenda that they don’t want to accept the good news. In fact, the drama on Capitol Hill has diverted attention from the recovery underway in an America which is not connected to political wrangling. As Larry Summers once put it, ‘The great mistake of the gridlock theorists is to suppose that all progress comes from legislation and that more legislation consistently represents more progress.’ Even so, the US system of government has been surprisingly nimble despite its perceived political paralysis. In the five years since the financial crisis, Congress has passed legislation that saved the US financial system, rescued the car-making sector, enacted the largest fiscal stimulus programme in the world (which contained substantial tax cuts), overhauled its financial regulation, passed ambitious health-care legislation, and then took steps to control spending. This week, the House and Senate are moving forward on comprehensive immigration reform. Compared with Britain — or anywhere in Europe — the US has been a hive of productive political activity. By contrast, the emerging Brics, who were supposed to take over the world, have seen better days. Brazil is confronting massive protests from citizens angry that so much money is being spent to prepare for the World Cup. Russia’s energy boom is tapering off; Moscow finds itself starved of foreign capital due to the caprice of President Putin. China’s economic growth during the Great Recession has far outstripped the United States; and yet its new leadership is rejecting the ‘Beijing consensus’ as quickly as it can. Indeed China may be heading for its own credit crunch: in recent weeks, its bank lending rates have surged and one bank briefly defaulted. The country’s attempts to clamp down on the misallocation of cheap credit may well have triggered its latest bout of financial turmoil. There is no denying that the relative power of the United States is less now than it was a decade ago. And yet, five years after the start of the Great Recession, US power does not appear to be on the wane. If anything, the trendlines suggest the opposite. Even Arvind Subramanian, the author of Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance, has changed his tune a bit. In a recent paper he paraphrased Mark Twain, concluding: ‘Reports of the decline in American economic power appeared to have been exaggerated.’ Plenty of dangers lie ahead. The United States could get trapped into another draining war in the Middle East. Partisan bickering in Washington could block any structural budget reforms and cripple America’s long-term finances. A premature end to quantitative easing, or another eurozone crisis, could induce another setback. But the United States has a remarkable ability to right its own ship. That ability, in and of itself, is one of the sources of its enduring power.

## Security K

## 1NC Shell – New

Attempts to economically engage and intervene in Latin America causes a framework of securitization – exacerbates tensions which inevitably results in conflict

Acharya 95 – Amitav, Professor of Global Governance at American and UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Chair of the ASEAN Studies Center (“The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies”, 1995, http://guessoumiss.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/critical-security-studies.pdf)

The above-mentioned features of in security in the Third World constitute a highly relevant explanatory framework for analyzing the major sources of instability in the post-Cold War era. To begin with, they aid our understanding of the emergence and escalation of conflicts and instability in the new states of Europe and Central Asia, which now constitute some of the most serious threats to the post—Cold War international order. Even though one may debate whether these states should be formally recognized as forming part of the so-called Third World, it is quite clear that there are striking similarities between the former’s security problems and those of the existing Third World category. These include fairly low levels of sociopolitical cohesion and a strong element of a state—nation dichotomy, with consequent problems of ethnic strife and regime insecurity. Ayoob notes that “in terms of their colonial background, the arbitrary construction of their boundaries by external powers, the lack of societal cohesion, their recent emergence into juridical statehood, and their stage of development, the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as of the Balkans demonstrate political, economic and social characteristics that are in many ways akin to Asian, African, and Latin American states that have been traditionally considered as constituting the Third World.”39 In a broader context, the Third World security experience suggests the need to view the majority of the post-Cold War conflicts as a product of local factors, rather than of the changing structure of the international system from bipolarity to multipolarity. Some observers have suggested that the Cold War had suppressed “many potential third-world conflicts”; its end will ensure that “other conflicts will very probably arise from decompression and from a loosening of the controls and self—controls” exercised by the superpowers.40 But such a view obscures the unchanged role of essentially domestic and intraregional factors related to weak national integration, economic underdevelopment, and competition for political legitimacy and control in shaping Third World instability. Roberto Garcia Moritan has argued: Many of the regional problems and/or conflicts that were essentially local expressions of the [Cold War] rivalry are now proving soluble. But there are many other conflicts rooted in other sources, among them historical, political, colonial, ethnic, religious, or socio-economic legacies, that continue to produce international tensions. Cutting across these local issues are the major disparities of wealth and opportunity that separate the industrialized nations and the developing world. These have existed for decades. The failure to deal effectively with this gap is a source of additional tension, which itself frustrates long-term efforts to provide wider prosperity. The end of the Cold War has been irrelevant for many such conflicts.41 The view of regional conflicts as “essentially local expressions of rivalry” also underscores the need to rethink structuralist ideas that tend to analyze regional security in terms of systemic factors. During the Cold War, the theory of “regional subsystems” contributed to a system-dominant view of regional security (because a subsystem can only be located in relation to a larger international system).42 Buzan’s concept of a “security complex” offers a more powerful and specific tool for regional security analysis by focusing on “local sets of states… whose major security perceptions and concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security perceptions cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”43 But Buzan, too, sees security complexes as localized sets of essentially anarchic relations that mirror the international system at large and whose existence is revealed and shaped largely by structural shifts. Thus, in Buzan’s view, colonialism and the Cold War constituted a structural “overlay” in which regional security complexes were shaped primarily by system-wide great power interactions. This overlay had suppressed many regional conflicts, which are now set to reappear.44 Such a structuralist bias may inhibit an appreciation of the range of social, cultural, and political forces that may be unique to different regions, and that may not be significantly affected by the end of the Cold War. There is sufficient empirical evidence to support Fred Halliday’s view that “since the causes of third world upheaval [were] to a considerable extent independent of Soviet—U.S. rivalry they will continue irrespective of relations between Washington and Moscow.”45 In Africa, which the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency rates to be “the most unstable region in the Third World,”46 recent outbreaks of conflict (as in Rwanda and Somalia) are rooted in old ethnic and tribal animosities.47 In Asia, the end of the two major Cold War conflicts (Afghanistan and Cambodia) leaves a number of ethnic insurgencies and separatist movements. In South Asia, the problems of political instability and ethnic separatism continue to occupy the governments of India (Assam, Kashmir, and the Punjab), Pakistan (demands for autonomy in the Sind province), and Sri Lanka (Tamil separatism).48 The Southeast Asian governments face similar problems, especially in Indonesia (Aceh, East Timor, Irian Jaya), Myanmar (Karen and Shan guerrillas), and the Philippines (the New People’s Army). In the more economically developed parts of the Third World, the primary security concerns of the ruling regimes derive from what Shahram Chubin calls the “stresses and strains of economic development, political integration, legitimation and institutionalization.”49 A good example is the situation in the Persian Gulf, where despite the recent attention to interstate wars (for example, the Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), the threat from within remains a central cause of concern about the stability and survival of the traditional monarchies. While it is tempting to explain the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, billed to be the first Third World conflict of the post-Cold War era, as an act of opportunism in the face of declining superpower involvement in the region, the roots of this conflict can only be explained in terms of the nature and position of Saddam Hussein’s regime within the Iraqi polity. The Iraqi aggression was at least partly an attempt by the regime to ensure its survival in the face of a growing economic burden imposed by the Iran-Iraq War and the consequent political challenges to its legitimacy. There is another reason why the Third World security experience is highly relevant to post-Cold War security analysis. Conflicts in the post-Cold War era are likely to become even more regional in their origin and scope because of the changing context of great power intervention. The post-Cold War era is witnessing a greater regional differentiation in great power interests and involvement in the Third World. In a bipolar world, as Kenneth Waltz has argued, “with two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happen [ed] anywhere [was] potentially of concern to both of them.”50 In a multipolar world, not all great powers would wield a similar capacity, and the only power capable of global power projection, the United States, is likely to be quite selective in choosing its areas of engagement. This will render conflict formation and management in these areas more localized, subject to regional patterns of amity and enmity and the interventionist role of regionally dominant powers. The diffusion of military power to the Third World is enabling some regional powers to exercise greater influence in shaping conflict and cooperation in their respective areas. With the end of the Cold War, some parts of the Third World are likely to experience a shift from internal to external security concerns, while others will remain primarily concerned with internal stability. There are indications that territorial disputes could become more salient for a growing number of Third World states in Africa, Latin America (Ecuador and Peru), and Southeast Asia (especially among the ASEAN nations). The more developed states in the Third World (such as the newly industrializing countries) are reshaping their defense capabilities from counterinsurgency to conventional warfare postures. For example, the Gulf Cooperation Council members are devoting more resources to external security after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, while in Southeast Asia there is a distinct shift from internal security to external defense capabilities. A number of major Third World powers, such as India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Iran, are developing extended power-projection capabilities, which is bound to alarm their neighbors into giving greater attention to external security. In general, the end of the Cold War is not having a single or uniform effect on Third World stability. In some parts of the Third World (such as in sub-Saharan Africa), the end of the Cold War has led to greater domestic disorder, while in Southeast Asia it has led to increased domestic tranquillity and regional order (with the end of communist insurgencies and the settlement of the Cambodian conflict), and in the Middle East, to greater interstate cooperation (especially after the Israeli—Palestinian accords). In Africa, the end of the Cold War has contributed to a sharp decline in arms imports, while in East Asia, it has created fears of a vigorous arms race. The rise of domestic conflicts in Africa contrasts sharply with the settlement of its long-standing regional conflicts (especially in southern Africa). In Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Korean Peninsula, the end of the Cold War has led to greater interstate conflict. Regional hegemonism is a marked trend in East Asia with China’s emergence, but elsewhere, it is the regional powers, such as India, Vietnam, and Iraq, that have felt the squeeze by being denied privileged access to arms and aid from their superpower patrons. In view of the above, it is not helpful to interpret conflict structures in the post-Cold War period as the product of a single structural or systemic realignment; a more differentiated view of the post—Cold War disorder is required. Finally, the Third World security experience suggests the need to focus on economic and ecological changes that are giving rise to new forms of regional conflicts. The issue of economic development remains at the heart of many of these conflicts. Although economically induced instability in the Third World has been traditionally viewed as a function of underdevelopment, such instability is becoming more associated with the strategies for, and the achievement of, developmental success. In Africa, structural adjustment and growth—oriented economic liberalization mandated by lending agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have led to acute political strife and regime insecurity. On the other hand, many of the successful developing countries of East and Southeast Asia today exhibit the performance paradox. In these cases, authoritarian regimes seeking legitimacy through the performance criteria (that is, rapid economic development) are confronted with the paradoxical outcome of political instability caused by an erosion of traditional social values and/or demands for political participation by an expanded middleclass population. As a result, the security predicament of countries with considerable developmental success (such as the NICS [newly industrializing countries] and near-Nics) remains essentially Third Worldish, that is, for these states, the threat from within is arguably more severe than the threat from without. In this sense, the concept of a Third World, while losing its meaning in economic terms (given the accelerating economic differentiation within this category), remains analytically useful in security terms. Numerous empirical studies have established that the Third World is the main arena of conflicts and instability linked to environmental degradation.51 The view of the environment as a global commons should not obscure the fact that the scale of environmental degradation, its consequences in fostering intra—and interstate conflict, and the problems of addressing these issues within the framework of the nation-state are more acute in the Third World than in the developed states. Of the three categories of conflict identified by Thomas Homer-Dixon as being related to environmental degradation, two—“simple scarcity conflicts” (conflict over natural resources such as rivers, water, fish, and agriculturally productive land) and “relative deprivation conflicts” (the impact of environmental degradation in limiting growth and thereby causing popular discontent and conflict)—are most acute in the Third World.52 Moreover, environmental degradation originating in the Third World is increasingly a potential basis for conflict between the North and the South, as poorer nations demand a greater share of the world’s wealth and Third World environmental refugees aggravate existing group-identity conflicts (the problems of social assimilation of the migrant population) in the host countries. The Third World security experience is helpful not only in understanding the sources of insecurity in the post-Cold War era, but also for judging the effectiveness of global-order-maintenance mechanisms. As during the Cold War period, the management of international order today reflects the dominant role of great powers, albeit now operating in a multipolar setting. The sole remaining superpower, the United States, has taken the lead in espousing a “new world order,” whose key elements include a revival of collective security and the relatively newer frameworks of humanitarian intervention and nonproliferation. But as during the Cold War period, attempts by the globally dominant actors to manage international order do not correspond with regional realities in the Third World. Moreover, these attempts have contributed to a climate of mistrust and exacerbated North-South tensions.

These types of security policies justifies global destruciton

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

“everything is dangerous” causes WMD development on a “suicide pact”

Looking tough causes others to think we’re a threat which causes this violence

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori  argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

The alternative is to reject the affs hegemonic discourse to open up avenues to break down imperialistic dominance

Kirkpatrick 81 – (Jeane, “U.S. Security & Latin America” Jeane J. Kirkpatrick was Leavey Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Scholar, diplomat, loyal friend of Commentary and champion of liberty, Kirkpatrick died on December 7, 2006. Her seminal essay, “Dictatorships & Double Standards,” published in Commentary’s November 1979 issue, led directly to her appointment by Ronald Reagan as United States ambassador to the United Nations.” Available online @ http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/u-s-security-latin-america/)

No one expressed the new spirit better than Zbigniew Brzezinski, whose book, Between Two Ages (sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations), spelled out the implications of the new spirit for Latin American policy. Brzezinski argued that U.S. Latin American policies were inappropriate to the new realities of declining ideological competition, declining nationalism, increased global interdependence, and rising Third World expectations. The U.S. should therefore give up its historic hemispheric posture, which had postulated a “special relationship” with Latin America and emphasized hemispheric security and, since World War II, anti-Communism. We should, instead, make an explicit move to abandon the Monroe Doctrine, “concede that in the new global age, geographic or hemispheric contiguity no longer need be politically decisive,” adopt a “more detached attitude toward revolutionary processes,” demonstrate more “patience,” and take an “increasingly depoliticized” approach to aid and trade. The views of hemispheric policy expressed in Between Two Ages were further elaborated in two other documents born in the bosom of the foreign-policy establishment: the reports issued in the name of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations headed by Sol Linowitz and composed of “an independent, bipartisan group of private citizens from different sectors of U.S. society” funded by the Ford, Rockefeller, and Clark foundations. The intellectual framework and most of the specific recommendations of the two Linowitz reports were identical. Both affirmed that economic and technological developments had created new international problems, and that interdependence had generated a pressing need for a new global approach to those problems. U.S. policy toward Latin America, “from the Monroe Doctrine through the Good Neighbor Policy to the Alliance for Progress and its successor, the Mature Partnership,” was outmoded because based on assumptions which had been overtaken by history. Earmarked for the dustbin were the beliefs that the United States should have a special policy for Latin America; that Latin America constituted a “sphere of interest” in which the U.S. could or should intervene (overtly or covertly) to prevent the establishment of unpalatable governments; and that national security should be an important determinant of U.S. policy toward that area. Now, the first Linowitz report counseled: It [U.S. policy] should be less concerned with security in the narrowly military sense than with shared interests and values that would be advanced by mutually satisfactory political relations. The new approach was to be free of paternalism, “respectful of sovereignty,” tolerant of political and economic diversity. Above all, it was to be set in a consistent global framework. Most of the specific recommendations of the two Linowitz reports—negotiating the Panama Canal treaties, “normalizing” relations with Cuba, “liberalizing” trade and “internationalizing” aid, promoting human rights, and never, ever, intervening militarily—flowed from these new assumptions. Given détente, the U.S. could and should “keep local and regional conflicts outside the context of the superpower relationship” and no longer “automatically” see “revolutions in other countries and intraregional conflicts . . . as battlefields of the cold war.” And given interdependence (manifested in global phenomena like inflation and multinational corporations), the U.S. should no longer hope for or seek “complete economic and political security . . .” but instead participate in the new international agenda. Despite the commission’s determined globalism, it recognized that Cuba constituted a special case. Both reports recommended U.S. initiatives toward “normalization” of relations with Cuba and some acts (removing restrictions on travel, increasing scientific and cultural exchanges) regardless of overall progress on normalization. But the second report also noted Cuba’s military involvement in Africa and its support for “militant” and violence-prone Puerto Rican independistas, and concluded that full normalization of relations, however desirable, could take place only as Cuba gave assurances that its troops were being withdrawn from Angola and that it had no intention of intervening elsewhere. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ The most striking characteristic of the Linowitz recommendations was their disinterested internationalist spirit. U.S. policy, it was assumed, should be based on an understanding of “changed realities” and guided by an enlightened confidence that what was good for the world was good for the United States. Power was to be used to advance moral goals, not strategic or economic ones. Thus sanctions could be employed to punish human-rights violations, but not to aid American business; power could be used “to the full extent permitted by law” to prevent terrorist actions against Cuba, but not to protect U.S. corporations against expropriation. Nor was power to be a factor in designing or implementing economic aid or trade programs except where these were intended to promote human rights, disarmament, and nuclear non-proliferation. Like Brzezinski’s Between Two Ages, the Linowitz reports were, in the most fundamental sense, utopian. They assumed that technological change had so transformed human consciousness and behavior that it was no longer necessary for the United States to screen policies for their impact on national security. To be sure, neither argued that self-interest, conflict, or aggression had been entirely purged from the world. But Brzezinski asserted (and the Linowitz commission apparently believed) that only the Soviet Union was still engaged in truly “anachronistic” political behavior against which it was necessary to defend ourselves. Since no Latin American nation directly threatened the position of the United States, relations with them could be safely conducted without regard for national security. Adopting the Linowitz commission’s recommendations thus required abandoning the strategic perspective which had shaped U.S. policy from the Monroe Doctrine down to the eve of the Carter administration, and at the center of which was a conception of the national interest and a belief in the moral legitimacy of its defense. In the Brzezinski-Linowitz approach, morality was decoupled from the national interest, much as the future was divorced from the past. The goals recommended for U.S. policy were all abstract and supranational—“human rights,” “development,” “fairness.” Still, if the Linowitz reports redefined the national interest, they did not explicitly reject it as a guide to policy or name the U.S. as the enemy. This was left to the report of yet another self-appointed group whose recommendations bore an even closer resemblance to the actual policies of the Carter administration. This report, The Southern Connection, was issued by the Institute for Policy Studies Ad Hoc Working Group on Latin America. The group included key personnel of the Linowitz commission, and it endorsed most of the specific recommendations of the second Linowitz report—divestment of the Panama Canal, normalization of relations with Cuba, strict control of anti-Castro activists, aid through multilateral institutions, limitations on arms sales and nuclear proliferation, and systematic linkage of human-rights concerns to all other aspects of policy. But the IPS report went beyond these in various respects. First, it not only proposed a break with the past, but contained a more sweeping indictment of past U.S. policy as reflecting an “unquestioned presumption of U.S. superiority” and an “official presumption of hegemony” which was not only outdated but also “morally unacceptable